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John Courtney Murray, S.J.: A Model of Engagement
Remarks of Robert John Araujo, S.J.*
Imagine yourself transported to some small town in New England
that still utilizes the town meeting model for its governance. A
moderator guides the discourse, but the citizenry discuss and debate
how they will live their lives in common and by what meansengagement is critical if the process of self-government is to succeed. If
the scene were not contemporary or seventeenth-century New England,
it could be the ancient Greek city-state. The common denominator is
engagement that necessitates reasoned discourse, patience, learning,
consideration, evaluation, and then, action. One might ask the question
if today's political exchanges that are often reported in various news
media can be characterized by the model presented.
If I may stimulate your reflection and imagination, think of a famous
television news program-no names mentioned, of course-where the
moderator asks blunt questions demanding the monosyllabic answers of
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either "yes" or "no." Is this engagement, or is it something else? Is it
the means of testing the merits of different ideas dealing with common
life-the res publica-or is it something else? One might also recall
the cable news stations' panels of experts that proliferate this form of
media and ask if there is patient, reasoned discourse characteristic of
engagement, or might it be more aptly portrayed as the "battle of the
talking heads"? As we proceed as a nation through another election
season, do we see evidence of engagement or battle in our important
political discussions?
Here it would be useful to scrutinize the meaning of the term
engagement and its root word, the transitive verb engage. Let me begin
with the second word first. While this verb can mean to enter into
combat or conflict, that is not the definition upon which I rely-nor is it
the one that ought to be associated with political and public discoursethough it may, nevertheless, offer an apt description of what happens in
the public square these days. Rather, my focus on the meaning relevant
to my presentation follows: the notion this word addresses, i.e., of
making a pledge, is relevant and important. By employing the word
engage, the speaker intensifies the significance of pledging oneself to
enter an undertaking. The undertaking I have in mind is political
discourse and debate offered by fellow citizens where exhortation and
persuasion are vital to the enterprise that pertains to the welfare and
common good of the community and all its members.
The meaning of engagement that I contemplate follows: it is a formal
or established process or procedure in which persons encounter and
discuss their lives in common so that, through reasoned debate, they
take stock of the intelligible reality that pertains to the issues debated.
Thus, principles and norms addressing the needs of their lives in
common can be recognized and established.
Does this definition explain or describe the political processes of the
present day? One need not go any further than a cable television news
program or computer screen to determine if this is what is constitutive
of "political debate" of the present age. More often than not, today's
"debates" are frequently shouting matches where it is presumed that the
most effective participants are the ones who can say the most
outrageous things to their debate partners and adversaries in a few
seconds. In candor, we might acknowledge that something like this
process exists, and it is practiced not only by the political commentators
but also by some members of the political community who may happen
to encounter a television news crew or call together the televised media
reporters for a press conference. However, frankness also requires
acknowledgment that in other circumstances a process akin to verbal
combat prevails in which verbal abuse is met with verbal abuse. To call
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this process reasoned debate would be mistaken. Accuracy would
demand other nomenclature such as the contemporary images suggested
by the titles of violent video games: e.g., Mortal Kombat, Grand Theft
Auto, Doom, or Counter-Strike. If you find the latter understanding of
engagement unattractive, as I do, how might a model more conducive to
the first understanding be constructed? The question is timely as we
approach a time of crucial decision-making for our country that will
have implications on the world. My proposal is based on the work and
thought of John Courtney Murray as an appropriate model of
engagement.
As I mentioned in the first lecture of this series in November 2009,1
John Courtney Murray was born in New York City in 1904, the son of
an Irish-American mother and a Scottish-American lawyer father. He
entered the Society of Jesus at the age of sixteen. After his theological
studies and ordination in the United States, he pursued doctoral studies
at the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome. Upon successful
completion of these studies in 1937, he returned to the United States to
teach at the Jesuit theologate in Woodstock, Maryland. In 1941, he was
appointed as the editor of the then new journal Theological Studies.
Notwithstanding his own theological expertise, he was drawn into
various projects that intersected the relationship between the church and
the state, especially in the United States. Others drew on his
understanding of how the moral perspective might or ought to intersect
with public policy. His best-known publication was the 1960 book We
Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition,

which contained thirteen essays written between 1950 and 1960. In it,
he addressed issues dealing with the person who is a citizen of both the
City of God and the City of Man and how this dual citizen is to conduct
himself or herself in public matters. However, even if one considers
that he or she is only a citizen of the City of Man, Murray's work is still
relevant as it pertains to standards essential for engagement in the public
square of a pluralistic society. Although critiqued after his death as
"impossibly old hat" by a younger generation, he was, as George
Weigel reminds us, "resurrected by Catholic thinkers seeking materials
from which to build a religiously informed public philosophy for the
American experiment in ordered liberty." 2

1. Robert John Araujo, S.J., John Courtney Murray, S.J.: A Citizen of Two Cities, Remarks at
the Inaugural Lecture of the John Courtney Murray Chair (Nov. 10, 2009), in 42 LoY. U. CHI. L.J.
i, ii (2010).
2. George Weigel, Truths Still Held?, FIRST THINGS (May 2010), available at
http://www.firstthings.com/article/2010/04/truths-still-held.
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Now that our federal republic is in its 221st year of operation (if I use
the Constitution of 1787 as the benchmark), many may think it odd to
view the method and systems that surround our American polity as an
experiment. In one fashion, we look at the durable Constitution as well
as the politico-legal system it established and might conclude that it has
enabled the nation to survive civil and world wars, grave economic
crises, and other great tests. But the nature of these wars, crises, and
other tests have differed, and the nation's responses to them have been
diverse as well. In some ways, then, we may see that the responses of
the nation, a people, and their leaders have taken different paths to
address exceptional events that often seemed to challenge the very
existence of our country. And yet, the nation and its people survived
and flourished.
In the context of the American republic and its people, there exists
the notion of the experiment in ordered liberty-an idea that Murray
himself understood well. 3 An experiment need not be something done
once and then either forgotten or presumed to prove something. If
experiments are worth doing once, they are most likely worth repeating
to verify both accuracy and truth. In the context of the American people
and Murray's thinking, the experiment was to be understood as a way of
life in which citizens-be they friend or foe on particular issues-are
united in the common project of preserving, protecting, and defending
the American form of republican democracy. This, as I am sure you
will acknowledge, is no easy task. But the fact that it is not easy does
not make it impossible, nor should it deter the members of the polity
from the experimentation.
For Murray, it seems that the experiment is and has to be the ongoing
project of most members of the polity, and this requires their individual
and corporate participations in a variety of ways-most of the time as
citizens who vote, hold public office, or both. And the experiment is
always essential if the common good and the advantage of public
interest are to be enhanced and protected. Consensus is important to the
experiment, but consensus cannot be confused with the populace
following the will of any self-deputized political elite. Consensus is
only proper if it reflects clearly the argument entered by the citizens
themselves through the proper exercise of their sovereignty. This does
not mean that there must always be absolute agreement on all questions
debated. That would not be possible very often. But this does not

3.

See JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS

ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 36 (1960) (discussing the American pursuit of freedom and the

American belief that free government "is possible" provided that people are "governed by the
recognized imperatives of the universal moral law").
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preclude the fact that the decisions taken must be made in the genuine
public interest, promote the common good, and welcome as important
the vital contributions of all members of the republic. Conversation and
the debate examining the merits and weaknesses of different
perspectives-that is, both living together and talking together4-are
essential if democracy is to survive and not be pushed aside by the
totalitarianism of any political group whose members seem self-gifted
with the faulty realization that they have the best answer all the time.
The robust presence of ordered liberty is essential to democracy.
The goal of ordered liberty that promotes a common good takes
further shape by the experiment-that is, by the ongoing and enduring
participation of the citizenry. Ordered liberty is not license to do what
you want to do because you decide you want to do it and you think that
no one can or should stop you. This is not ordered liberty, but a recipe
for chaos. Vital to the experiment are two forms of responsible
freedom: speech and the press. But, as Murray shrewdly said, their
American conception does "not rest on the thin theory proper to
eighteenth-century individualistic rationalism, that a man [or woman]
has a right to say what he [or she] thinks merely because he [or she]
thinks it."5 It is essential to the American experiment that these goods
are not only private, but are public as well, for their justification out of
freedom must bear both dimensions if ordered liberty is to mean
something that is right and proper to republican democracy.
Ordered liberty is that part of the American proposition and
experiment where "ideas are circulated and criticized" 6-yes, criticized
with the honored tools of fairness and objective reasoning. This must
mean, if the experiment is to remain worthwhile, that the views and the
truths that they claim to hold are subject to a scrutiny that is
simultaneously objective and honorable. As we think further about this
ordered liberty of which I speak, it is crucial to recognize another
essential element, namely, the kind of person whose participation is
critical to the success of the experiment. Fr. Murray once said that
"only a virtuous people can be free." 7 The virtues constitutive of this
kind of people would include justice, courage, forbearance, and
prudence. Are these virtues the stuff from which political debate is
made these days? Murray understood his proposition well and offered
as part of his justification for his view the words of Lord Acton's
definition of freedom as "not the power of doing what we like, but the
4.
5.
6.
7.

Id
Id
Id
Id

at 13.
at 34.
at 35.
at 36.
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right of being able to do what we ought."8 For Murray, the American
proposition could not be restricted only to a political experiment-it had
to be "a spiritual and moral enterprise" as well.9 The experiment is not
static but ongoing. And where is it going? Simply, it is directed not to
the success of the present moment but to the posterity of the American
people of which the Constitution speaks, and to the moral certitude of
choosing right over wrong and good over evil. As Murray exhorted,
"Neither as a doctrine nor as a project is the American Proposition a
finished thing." 10
I submit that this work of John Courtney Murray provides an
advantageous model of engagement sorely needed in the public square
today. In some exchanges that loosely pass for debates, harsh words are
dispersed like grapeshot fired from ancient cannons, indiscriminately
hitting targets but doing little to garner thoughtful listeners and citizen
This apprehension I raise does not mean that
comprehension.
participants in public exchanges, i.e., political engagement, must be
milquetoasts and not plainly speak their minds, but they should be able
to present rational perspectives regarding what they recognize as right
and wrong, as good and evil, as proper and improper, and how these
perspectives must figure into the decisions to be made on behalf of the
common good. From experience, most of us can acknowledge that
This is
telling others they are wrong can raise problems.
understandable. The point is not simply to say someone is wrong and
leave in a huff after the message is brusquely delivered. Rather, the
point, as well as the way of proceeding, is to explain with charity and
firmness why the other's position is unsound and wrong and to await
patiently a coherent response. Hence, a proper democratic debate can
begin.
If virtue is essential to freedom and the republican democracy that
can follow and flourish, so is civility. Civility is a common commodity
that inheres in virtually everyone. But it is rarely displayed and
exercised in some political discussions. If engagement is essential to
sound and moral public decision making, civility is the bonding agent
that holds the processes of engagement together. Murray conceded that
civility and dialogue are necessary companions to the American
experiment in ordered liberty. As he said, "Civility dies with the death
of the dialogue." I Murray reinforced his belief with the views of
others who similarly recognized the importance of civility, dialogue,
8. Id.
9. Id

10. Id at vii.
11. Id at 14.
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and informed debate to making informed decisions for the res publica.
One of these voices quoted by Murray was that of Thomas Gilby, the
Dominican who argued in his 1953 book Between Community and
Society that "[c]ivilization is formed by men locked together in
argument."l 2 Being the versatile thinker that he was, Murray quickly
noted that not all social beings come together for debate that is premised
on reasoned argument. As he said, "Wolves do not argue the merits of
running in packs."1 3 The essence and nature of the human person as an
individual and as a member of society differs from that of animals that
associate with herds or packs. Still, there is danger in persons coming
together not as rational beings but as those driven with some packmentality belief that their view is not just the right view, but the only
view-so why bother considering other perspectives? This approach is
not the method of the good citizen but of the barbarian-as Murray
spoke of him or her.
Who is this barbarian? And what is it that the barbarian threatens?
Here one needs to take stock of the meanings of the word barbarian and
the acts of such a person who may or do threaten the civilization with
which one is not only familiar, but which one seeks to protect. First, we
must recall Murray's exhortation that the American proposition and
experiment must "be constantly argued,"' 4 as it is an ongoing project
that must be passed on from generation to generation. The experiment
is not an inert or stagnant thing, for the American republic is an active
thing-active and animated because its members, its people who are the
gens (the nation), continue to live, continue to strive, and continue to
improve (or at least try to improve) on that which has gone before.
Here enters the barbarian who wishes to challenge these hopes,
expectations, and contributions that are often expressed and that sustain
the harmonious public square where the members of the polity assemble
to advance the common good through reasoned and passionate debate.
The barbarian and his acts rely on the lack or absence of reasonable and
reasoned conversation that requires reasonable norms. 15 Political
discourse, exchange, and conversation in the modes that Murray
understood them necessitate two essential components: the first is
"living together" and the second follows-"talking together."' 6 These
important attributes of republican democracy require more than merely
coexisting in the same dimension. They are an intentional enterprise

12. Id. at 6.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id at 11.
Id. at 13.
Id.
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characteristic of and essential to republican democracy. Without
"conversation" as understood in these terms, the res publica can easily
disintegrate.
Murray warned us that the barbarian "need not appear in bearskins
with a club in hand." 17 In fact, the barbarian of Murray's day was more
recognizable by the stylish business suit or the academic gown that he
or she may be wearing. But these outward appearances of civilization
and indicia of civility cannot always conceal the "child of the
wilderness, untutored in the high tradition of civility."' 8 For Murray,
the recurrent project of the barbarian is this:
[T]o undermine rational standards of judgment, to corrupt the
inherited intuitive wisdom by which the people have always lived, and
to do this not by spreading new beliefs but by creating a climate of
doubt and bewilderment in which clarity about the larger aims of life
is dimmed and the self-confidence of the people is destroyed, so that
finally what you have is the impotent nihilism . . . appearing on our

university campuses. 19
According to Murray, the hallmarks of the barbarian of the present
age include the "rejection of the traditional role of reason and logic in
human affairs." 20 Indicative of this would be the emergence of
evidence that places into question several presuppositions: that human
beings are intelligent; that the world and reality that surrounds it are
intelligible; and that these two factors combine to enable citizens to
formulate the norms by which they choose to live in furtherance of the
common good. And this all requires frank discussion about what should
be done if the res publica and all that it encompasses are to be
preserved.
Complementary to the success of this venture is the need on the part
of all participants to participate as both contributing speakers and
listeners who desire to hear and consider the propositions made by their
fellow citizens, be they voters or holders of office. Throughout this
process, the notion so appealing to our forebearers about self-evident
principles that are intelligible by the intelligent person and translatable
into society's norms should also be evident to us almost a quarter
millennium later. Let me emphasize this point: with the greatest respect
due to Mr. Rodney King, neither Murray nor I are making the appeal,
"Why can't we all just get along?" That is not the nature of
engagement. Getting along means making a truce and often accepting

17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 12.
Id
Id
Id.
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the status quo ante. Engagement means, as is consistent with
conversation, living together and talking together to improve the present
moment for now and the future. The nature of the discourse may often
reveal disagreement. But it is the talking together that brings about
refinement of the areas of both agreement and disagreement along with
work geared to taking stock of these positions to make the res publica
more perfect-that is, more sufficient upon the cooperation and
collaboration of its members. Political and social conversation also
provides the meeting of minds so that citizens become better attuned to
what they do and do not share in common. The conversation so
essential to republican democracy also stimulates and sustains the
environment in which problems that threaten the community and the
common good can be more readily identified so that potential remedies
can be explored and their merits evaluated in a manner that maximizes
the furtherance of the common good.
In short, the conversation that is crucial to the success-or at least the
continuance-of republican democracy is the living together and talking
together that are mindful of the truths that surround the human person,
the essence and nature of the human person, and the society that is
conducive to human flourishing for all-not just some-of society's
members. If there are Americans skeptical about the existence and
reality of truth, we need to remind ourselves here and now that this
great nation was founded on truth-certain self-evident truths. If these
self-evident truths are to be denied, then the Declaration of
Independence, the Constitution, and their meanings are nothing more
than fragile gossamer. Truths are important to the essence of the human
person, the societies in which these persons live, and the norms they
formulate in community for their individual and communal prosperitythe common good. Some of these truths include: all are created equal in
certain fundamental ways, and all are endowed by their Creator-yes,
their Creator-with certain unalienable rights.
Let me pause here to provide some emphasis: These rights are not the
product of the state or the laws that the state periodically promulgates.
These unalienable rights are founded in another source-one who has
been recognized by many but denied by others. So be the disagreement,
but let us agree on this: those who established our republic and the
democracy that has emerged from it acknowledged this truth about
these rights and their source. Moreover, they had the wisdom and
courage to acknowledge that the proper role of the state is not in the
making of these rights, but in securing and protecting them. In short,
what the state does not create, it cannot deny. This is truth, pure and
uncomplicated.
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Mindful of this launching point, the Framers of the Constitution were
quick to note in the prologue of this venerable, basic law that there is a
common good at stake that must be protected. Why do I assert this?
How can I assert this? Listen to the words chosen by them: "in order to
establish a more perfect union"; "to establish justice"; "to insure
domestic tranquility"; "to provide for the common defense"; "to
promote the general welfare"; and "to secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and our posterity."21 These are words that further reflect the
truths acknowledged in the Declaration of Independence. Moreover,
these truths are a crucial defense against the cynicism and nihilism that
can often interfere with and threaten our republican democracy. In this
regard, we need to be all the more mindful of the words of our founders
when they spoke not only of "ourselves" 22 but of "our posterity" 23 as
well. Conversation is vital to the present moment, and it is critical to
the promises of the future as well as the existence of the future.
Freedom, particularly of well-reasoned speech and peaceful
assembly, are imperative if the truth is to be known and circulated
among citizens. Freedom does not require flamboyant rhetoric, a high
decibel level, or vulgar or sensational language. It does mandate,
however, the ability to communicate clearly and the capacity to be
received by those whose views are being informed. This freedom of
communication does not prevent robust debate; rather, it vigorously
promotes it. In addition, this freedom welcomes constructive exchanges
that ought to lead to the refinement and the improvement of the ideas
being disseminated. The more that perspectives important to the issues
of the day are distributed, discussed, and debated, the more
authentically free is the society and its members. In addition, this
robust exchange and debate that ensues promotes the securing of the
truth about the matters under review and discussion. Access to the truth
requires participation and mutual exchanges by those who pursue it. By
contrast, those uninterested in or fearful of the truth will not engage in
the exchanges necessary for its encounter; moreover, some may even
stifle the debate so that the fruitful exchanges essential to the truth's
discovery will never take place. This is the hallmark of both the
barbarian and the totalitarian of the twenty-first century. Murray
identified this freedom of exchange and receipt as "a civil right of the
first order, essential to the American concept of a free people under a
limited government." 24
21. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 35.
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And yet, we see this civil right being restricted-even silenced-in
some quarters that insist on their dedication to democracy and human
rights. The recent incident at the University of Illinois involving Dr.
Kenneth Howell provides an illustration. He was hired, then fired, and
then rehired for teaching Catholic moral theology on issues involving
human sexual morality in a course clearly advertised as one in which
Catholic morality would be explained and taught. Murray correctly
noted the importance of the freedom of communication "whereby ideas
are circulated and criticized." 25 It was ironic that the Howell incident
involved an institution of higher learning where "the pursuit of truth and
the perpetuation of the intellectual heritage of society" 26 are presumed
to be welcomed and given refuge when political tempests elsewhere
restrict the safe harbors where the exchange of ideas must take place.
Again I must recall Fr. Murray's counsel that "only a virtuous people
can be free." 27 But free for what? How is freedom to be understood?
Is it tied to the "truth"? In the 1960s, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
understood the truth and accepted the consequences of proclaiming it
where the political environment did not welcome it.
The true exercise of freedom vital to republican democracy is
dependent on the self-disciplining virtues of patience and honesty.
Patience cultivates a temperament conducive to listening to the
exchange and welcoming it. Honesty promotes the necessary humility
essential to each of us proclaiming that the truth we seek may be beyond
me and my thoughts of which I think so highly. With patience and
honesty shared all around, the exchanges crucial to the success of the
American experiment and its republican democracy will likely never be
threatened. Without these virtues permeating the public square, the
experiment and its fruit can easily be forfeited.
Of course, an important objective of the exchanges conducive to the
American experiment and its republican democracy is the making of
norms-that is, laws by which the society and its members promote
harmonious public life in which policy decisions are made in a just and
equitable fashion. Now, it would be relevant here to ask the question: is
there some way of thinking about law and the juridical nature of society
that would also be a companion of the model of public engagement that
I have been developing? If we turn once again to Fr. Murray, we find
an answer: the natural law.

25. Id.

26. Id.
27. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (introducing this proposition by Fr. Murray in the
context of ordered liberty).
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Murray understood the natural law and what it was about. He
acknowledged that it was also the jurisprudential foundation of the
American experiment. It should come as no surprise that it was not the
Hobbesian or Lockean idea of the "law of nature" that undergirds this
experiment and the republican democracy that it established; rather, it
was the natural law itself, so familiar to the likes of Augustine, Aquinas,
de Vitoria, Sudrez, Bellarmine, Jefferson, Adams, and Madison, just to
mention a few names-some familiar to us, others, perhaps not-that
was the foundation of the "more perfect union" set into motion between
1776 and 1787.
Of course, the natural law has ironically fallen out of favor with
many influential citizens today. They erroneously attribute to it the
defense of slavery and other nefarious institutions. They could not be
more wrong in this and related conclusions. Murray recognized this
problem in his time. He noted over a half century ago that the natural
law approach had neither been refuted nor rejected; however, it was
(and to this day is) no longer "taught or learned in the American
university." 28 I largely agree with Murray, although there are a few
exceptions to this deficiency frequently encountered in the academy
today. I am happy to say that Loyola University Chicago is one place
where it is offered and discussed! If you offer it, they will come-but I
digress!
Murray demonstrated the nexus between the Founders, which
included their educational and professional background and the fruit of
their political labor. The presence of the natural law that is dependent
on the intelligent person studying an intelligible world and reality and
crafting human law that reflects the encounter of the intelligent and the
intelligible is evident in the republic they gave us. As Murray stated,
the Founders inherited and used the tradition of natural law. 29
Murray continued his thoughts in this way: there is a universal moral
law that is the foundation of society. The Founders understood and
appropriated from this principle; they further recognized that the state
that they were establishing was "subject to judgment by a law that is not
statistical but inherent in the nature of man"; and, as Jefferson asserted
in the Declaration of Independence, that the eternal reason of the
Creator is "the ultimate origin of all law" and that the nation, the people,
are in free relationship with their governors but are also under the
Creator. 30 Murray saw evidence, however, that this important history of
28. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 40.
29. See id. at 41 ("To the early American theorists and politicians the tradition of natural law
was an inheritance.").
30. Id. at 42.
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the founding of the republic was being forgotten as the tradition of the
natural law and, while not being rejected outright, was being contested.
Drawing from Santayana, Murray suggested, "We do not refute our
adversaries ... [rather] we quietly bid them goodbye." 3 1
Let me emphasize again the point made by Fr. Murray and that I echo
here today: reasoned and respectful debate is essential to the American
experiment and to our republican democracy. Most of us know that it is
often difficult to enter a political discourse for fear of raising ideas or
views that are unpopular with others. We also know that making public
our views on many political, social, cultural, and economic issues of the
day may mark us as being on the "other" side. Truth be told, this has
been a major characteristic of public life for centuries from the Greek
city-states, to the Roman Senate, to the British Parliament, and to the
American citizens' participation in the public square. While most might
have a visceral reaction to expressing personal views on difficult issues,
we must acknowledge that the ability to express our views and take
seriously those with which we disagree is what makes democracy the
safeguard to the totalitarianism of the malevolent monarch, the tyrant,
or the despotic elite.
Professor Bradley Birzer makes the point quite clear in his recent
biography of Charles Carroll, American Cicero. The fact that Carroll
was a Roman Catholic and, prior to the Constitution of 1787, unable to
exercise the franchise because of his religion did not stop him from
participating in the robust debates leading up to the Revolution of 1776,
the implementation of the Articles of Confederation, and the
establishment of the federal republic in 1789.32 And he did so with
eloquence, with grace, with informed reasons, and, most importantly,
with respect for virtually any debate partner with whom he disagreed on
some issue. From our perspective, individuals like Carroll must not be
considered a relic of the past. They are still with us today, thanks be to
God, for their presence helps ensure the stability of good government
that is by the people and for the people. This mode of engagement,
when practiced by most officeholders, candidates for office, and
citizens, becomes an assurance that our republican democracy and the
nation it represents shall not perish from this earth.
While it is not the only factor, the manner in which political
discussions are conducted is a major concern in the fate of democracy.
Murray understood this well, but so have others. For example, James
Madison reminded his fellow Americans that "a well-instructed people
31.

Id. at 40.

32.

See generally BRADLEY J. BIRZER, AMERICAN CICERO: THE LIFE OF CHARLES CARROLL

(2010) (discussing the life and times of Charles Carroll).

HeinOnline -- 43 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. xiii 2011-2012

xiv

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 43

alone can be permanently a free people." 33 I would add that this good
instruction comes not from manipulators of information or authors of
ideology but from the engagement and exchanges of the citizens
themselves. But what if the laws were changed to prohibit the free
speech essential to republican democracy because citizens feared
reprisal, recrimination, persecution, or prosecution? Would they then
be likely to express their views that are essential to the consent of the
governed? Understanding well the motivation for and justification of
laws regulating so-called "hate speech," are there not other ways to
encourage much-needed debate without intimidating the wellintentioned citizen from speaking?
Here, there comes to bear a story chronicled by Max Farrand in his
The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787: a Mrs. Powel of

Philadelphia asked Dr. Benjamin Franklin the question, "Well Doctor
what have we got[?] [A] republic or a monarchy[?]" Franklin's retort
followed: "A republic . . . if you can keep it."3 4 It would appear that
Franklin saw that the republican democracy established in the
Constitution of 1787 would require the work of its citizens if it were to
survive not only in good times but in difficult times as well. This work
would necessitate the participation of its citizens. Again, an important
and rational method of this participation would reside in the ability to
exercise the right of speech and debate, not just by elected officials, but
by citizens as well. Otherwise, the fate of democracy would easily be
imperiled. As Murray observed, "[O]ne day the noble many-storeyed
mansion of democracy will be dismantled, levelled to the dimensions of
a flat majoritarianism, which is no mansion but a barn, perhaps even a
tool shed in which the weapons of tyranny may be forged." 35 Why and
how could these weapons be forged? My simple answer is this: If
citizens are in any way restrained from participation in their
government, how can they be well instructed? How can they participate
in their government if they are impeded in their ability to provide their
insights: into what should be done and what should not; into their views
on what is right and wrong; and into their distinctions between good and
evil. Their participation is essential to avoid the dismantling of the
mansion of republican democracy and to ensure that they remain well
instructed.

33.

James Madison, Second Annual Message (Dec. 5, 1810), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES

MADISON 123, 127 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1908).
34.

James McHenry, Anecdotes, in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,

at 85 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966).
35.

MURRAY, supra note 3, at 42.
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Engagement of and by citizens is essential to the continuation of the
American experiment and the success of its republican democracy. The
future of this engagement is in the hands of those who have the right
and the ability to exercise it properly. The choice is yours and mine to
make. As we make our respective choices about how each of us
chooses to be well instructed and participate in the government of our
society, knowing that many fellow citizens are comfortable in simply
going along with the views of others who seem to know what they are
talking about, the words of Robert Frost may be of help as we embrace
the rights and responsibilities of citizenship:
Two roads diverged in a wood, and II took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference. 36
Knowing how to live well with one another by talking meaningfully,
sincerely, and respectfully with one another is the road each of us can
travel. Which one do you choose?
Thank you so very much!

36. Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken, in THE OXFORD BOOK OF AMERICAN VERSE 556, 557
(Francis Otto Matthiessen ed., 1950).
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